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Abstract
In event studies of capital market efficiency, an earnings surprise has historically been
measured by the consensus error, defined as earnings minus the consensus or average of
professional forecasts. The rationale is that the consensus is an accurate measure of the
market’s expectation of earnings. But since forecasts can be biased due to conflicts of
interest and some investors can see through these conflicts, this rationale is flawed and
the consensus error a biased measure of an earnings surprise. We show that the fraction
of forecasts that miss on the same side (FOM), by ignoring the size of the misses, is
less sensitive to such bias and a better measure of an earnings surprise. As a result,
FOM out-performs the consensus error and its related robust statistics in explaining
stock price movements around and subsequent to the announcement date.
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1 Introduction
Economists historically measure the degree to which the market is surprised by an earnings
announcement or macro-economic news, such as inflation, GDP or interest rates, with the
consensus error. It is defined as the difference between the actual and the consensus forecast,
where the consensus is typically calculated using either the mean or median of the available
professional forecasts. The consensus error is a building block of event studies on how
efficiently markets react to news (see Kothari (2001) for a survey) .
For instance, a canonical regression specification in such event studies is that of the
cumulative abnormal return of a stock around the earnings announcement date (or CAR) or
subsequent to the announcement date (or POSTCAR) on the consensus error (or CE): the
more positive the earnings surprise CE the higher is the stock return CAR and also the higher
is the POSTCAR (see, e.g., Bernard and Thomas (1990), Bernard and Thomas (1989)).
These regressions indicate that markets only react to earnings announcements gradually and
have become a linchpin of the behavioral finance literature on inefficient markets.1
The key rationale justifying the ubiquitous use of this measure is that the consensus
forecast is an unbiased measure of the market’s expectation of earnings. But it is well known
that a subset of professional forecasts of earnings and macro-economic variables are biased
due to conflicts of interest or misaligned incentives. For instance, the analysts of banks
that have investment banking business with a company are likely to be optimistically biased
compared to analysts working for investment banks without such a relationship (Michaely
and Womack (1999), McNichols and O’Brien (1997), Lin and McNichols (1998), Lim (2001),
Hong and Kubik (2003)). Similarly, it is optimal for some analysts or even macro-forecasters
to strategically shade their forecasts, whether positively or negatively, away from their un-
biased signal if the rewards to the forecasting tournament are sufficiently convex (see, e.g.,
Keane and Runkle (1998), Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000), DellaVigna and Gentzkow
1For instance, under-reaction models of Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999)
deliver such a delayed reaction. See Hirshleifer (2001) and Barberis and Thaler (2003) for reviews.
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(2009)).
In the context of earnings forecasts for the stock market, there is compelling evidence
that institutional investors, in contrast to retail investors, adjust for these strategic biases in
forming their earnings expectations (see, e.g., Iskoz (2003), Malmendier and Shanthikumar
(2007), Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (2007)). The end result is that the consensus forecast is
no longer an unbiased or accurate measure of the market’s expectation of earnings. In other
words, the consensus forecast which averages in biased analyst forecasts might significantly
diverge from the expectations of the market since institutional investors, which comprise
the bulk of the market, form their expectations by debiasing these analyst forecasts. In the
context of the CAR and POSTCAR regressions, we ideally want an accurate and unbiased
measure of the true market surprise on the right-hand side. If CE as a proxy for the true
market surprise has substantial measurement error, this translates into poor explanatory
power for CE in these canonical regressions, thereby leaving room for a better measure of
the true market surprise.
The challenge from the point of view of the econometrician is how construct this better
measure given that the econometrician does not have the same information set as institutional
investors. The usual robust statistics such as medians cannot help since these statistics are
meant to deal with outliers and not systemic bias of forecasts. Importantly, it is difficult in
practice to identify ex-ante which of the forecasts are compromised. Otherwise, one could
make an adjustment by subtracting off the bias from the contaminated individual forecasts.
To deal with this problem, we propose a new market surprise measure — the fraction
of forecasts that miss on the same side or FOM, which is far less sensitive to such biased
forecasts and a far superior to the consensus error. Suppose that there are N forecasts and
K is the number of forecasts less than the actual A andM is the number of forecasts greater
than the actual A. Then fraction of misses below the actual is given by
FOM =
K
N
− M
N
,
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which takes on values between -1 and 1—the higher is FOM the more positive the earnings
surprise. For instance, when K = M , then FOM = 0 and there are equal misses on both
sides. When K = N and M = 0, then FOM = 1 and the actual lies above the range
of forecasts, which we will also denote by IActual>All = 1 (0 otherwise). In this case, the
market will be positively surprised and market returns positive around the announcement
date. When K = 0 and M = N , FOM = −1 and everyone has missed above the actual,
which we also denote by IActual<All = 1 (0 otherwise) and the market should be negatively
surprised and market returns negative around the announcement date.
We show below by using a simple model that our FOM better measures the true surprise
than CE when the bias of some forecasts are potentially large and ex-ante unobservable to the
econometrician. When these biased errors are not a big concern, then CE is more accurate
than FOM. In this model, we discuss why FOM is better than a number of alternatives
such as using median instead of mean forecasts or winsorization in the presence of outliers.
We use earnings forecast to frame our model and motivate our empirical analysis but the
methodology and ideas apply equally to any other types of forecasts in the literature.
First, to get an intuitive sense of why FOM is better than CE, consider the following
example. Suppose the market expectation for stock A’s earnings is 10 and stock B’s earnings
is also 10. Suppose there are N = 6 analysts for each stock. If a fraction of the forecasts
are negatively biased, one might see forecasts like -11, -10, 9, 10, 11, and 12 for stock A and
-10, -10, -10, 9, 10, and 11 for stock B. The large negative forecasts are the biased ones.
The mean consensus is 3.5 for stock A and 0 for stock B. Suppose the actual turns out to
be 14 for both stock A and stock B. In other words, the true market surprise is 4 and the
same for both stocks. But using the mean consensus, we get a CE of 10.5 for stock A and
14 for stock B. So using CE as a proxy, we would think there is more of a positive surprise
in stock B’s announcement than in stock A’s announcement, which is a wrong classification.
When we run the regression of CAR or POSTCAR on CE, in which CE is supposed to
be a proxy for the true earnings surprise, we suffer from measurement error and hence the
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coefficient on CE will be downward biased. However, the FOM is 1 for stock A and stock
B, or IActual>All = 1, which is the right classification in terms of ranking that both stock A
and B have the same true earnings surprise and hence we expect that a regression of CAR
or POSTCAR on FOM have superior explanatory power.
Essentially, when some of the forecasts are biased enough, it is better to discard mag-
nitudes and to simply count the fraction of misses. If everyone misses on the same side,
we know that even unbiased forecasts missed on the same side as biased forecasts, which is
enough to know that the market is truly surprised. Taking into account magnitudes, as the
traditional consensus error measure does, when some forecasts are biased leads to sorting on
bias as opposed to sorting on true market surprise.
Second, notice that in the example above, using the median of the forecasts rather than
the mean as the consensus does not help the CE measure. For stock A, the consensus
error using the median is 4.5 for stock A and 14.5 for stock B which is an even worse
classification than using the mean consensus. Third, in practice, event studies are ran using a
transformation of CE into a cross-sectional decile score from 1 to 10, which we call Rank(CE).
The Rank(CE) measure deals with outliers and offers a better fit for CAR and POSTCAR
than CE. But it is nonetheless dominated by our FOM measure as these rankings are a form
of winsorization and deal with outliers but not biases which significantly affect the CE and
the relative rankings of stocks that are considered positive or negative surprises.
Fourth, notice that the dispersion of forecasts in this example is also roughly equal for
both stock A and B. As a result, our findings are not driven by differences in the dispersion
of forecasts across stocks and we show that this is indeed the case. And finally, as long as the
fraction of biased forecasts stays constant with N , which is what it appears to be empirically,
such biases will remain important regardless of N and we expect our FOM measure to be
superior regardless of N .
Using annual forecasts of fiscal year-end earnings, the R2 of a canonical regression of
CAR (measured using the 3-day firm-size-adjusted return around the announcement date)
4
on CE is .30% and on its decile rank score Rank(CE) is 2.8%. CE is constructed using mean
of the most recent forecasts for the annual year-end FY1 earnings. So every firm has one
observation per year over the sample period from 1983 to 2011. A one standard deviation
increase in Rank(CE) increases the CAR by around 1.2%, a sizeable economic effect. For
POSTCAR, the portfolio long positive earnings surprise (decile rank score 10) and short
negative earnings surprise (decile rank score 1) yields a return of around 1.7% over the
subsequent four months after the announcement date or around 5% annualized.
Our FOM variable, however, performs better than CE or Rank(CE). For instance, FOM
variable gives an R2 of 4.1%. A one standard deviation increase in FOM increases CAR by
around 1.4%. When we run a horse race of FOM and Rank(CE), the coefficient in front of
FOM is virtually unchanged whereas the one in front of Rank(CE) is no longer significant.
For the POSTCAR, a portfolio long FOM = 1 stocks and short FOM = −1 stocks yields
a four-month subsequent return of 3.8% or nearly 11.4% annualized. Again, in a multiple
regression to explain POSTCAR, our FOM measure remains significant, whereas Rank(CE)
is insignificant.
We go on to verify that our findings remain robust even when controlling for differences
in the dispersion of forecasts across earnings events and that FOM works more consistently
across different sub-samples of analyst coverage. In addition, we show that FOM also predicts
revisions of the consensus forecast although not as well as stock prices since the consensus
forecasts includes some biased forecasts which presumably need not adjust since they are
driven by incentive reasons. However, to the extent there are unbiased forecasts that adjust
and learn from the announcement, we expect FOM to be informative about these revisions,
which it is.
Our paper proceeds as follows. We present a simple model to contrast the accuracy of our
FOM measure versus the CE measure under various assumptions in Section 2. We describe
our data and how we constructed our key variables of interest in Section 3. We present our
main empirical findings in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5. In the Appendix, we provide
5
further discussion and extensions of our model to account for various aspects of the data.
2 Modeling the Performance of CE versus FOM
In this Section, we develop a stylized model to explain why FOM might be different from
CE and Rank(CE) in terms of its effectiveness in capturing market surprises. Our argument
relies on some fraction of analysts’ forecasts being biased but the bias is not known to the
econometrician. This is consistent with the empirical studies cited in the Introduction on the
incentive reasons for why analysts forecasts might be biased. We are able to obtain analytic
solutions and prove that FOM is better than CE when the bias is large enough, which we
use to motivate our empirical work.
But for comparative statics, we need to use numerical calculations and will present these,
after presenting the empirical findings, in the Appendix on Extensions and Simulations.
Moreover, in this baseline model with bias, CE and Rank(CE) are essentially the same thing
and our arguments work for both. But in the data, the correlation of CE and Rank(CE) is
very low due to outliers in CE. The Rank(CE) measure largely takes care of these outliers.
We will add this element of outliers to our model in the Appendix so as to show that the
effectiveness of FOM relative to CE and Rank(CE) extends to a more general setting with
outliers.
2.1 Set-up
We start by assuming that actual (which we refer to as earnings through out but could as
well be macro-variables like inflation or GDP) is given by
A = e+ A, (1)
where e is the unobserved market expectation and A ∼ N (0, σ2A). The difference between
the announced earnings and the market expectation is the market surprise, which is given
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by
S = A− e. (2)
We then assume that individual forecasts i is the market expectation plus some noise i
and a possible bias term bi, which is given by
Fi =
 e+ i with prob. ω0e+ bi + i with prob. ω1 = 1− ω0 (3)
where i ∼ N (0, σ2F ) and is uncorrelated with A. Each forecast is unbiased with probability
ω0, and is contaminated by an individual bias term bi with probability ω1 = 1− ω0.
We model the bias in the following manner. For each set of N forecasts an aggregated
bias level B ∼ N (0, σ2B) is drawn first, and conditional on this realized B individual bias
bi follows N (B, σ2b ). Note that while ω0 and ω1 are fixed and do not change with N , the
realized number of biased forecasts can be different from its expectation ω1N . Therefore
conditional on each set of N forecasts, on average a fraction of ω1 of them are biased by a
random magnitude. Note that we still have E[Fi] = e+ ω1E[bi] = e+ ω1E[B] = e because B
follows a symmetric distribution around zero.
We can motivate this set-up as the market is able to figure out which forecasts are biased
and has access to information about the mean of earnings e beyond simply using analyst
forecasts. A is the unexpected shock to earnings which the market cannot know. The bias
bi can be derived in a number of ways. The simplest is as in Lim (2001). We show in the
Appendix an extension where the market’s expectation depends only on the analyst forecasts
and we can derive similar results.
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2.2 Proxies of market surprise
The consensus forecast is defined as
F¯ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Fi. (4)
A widely used measurement of market surprise then is the consensus error
CE = A− F¯ . (5)
We propose an alternative proxy for market surprises given by the fraction of misses from
below:
FOM =
#{Fi < A} −#{Fi > A}
N
. (6)
Conditional on N forecasts, the higher the realized actual is, the larger consensus error
should be, and the more individual forecasts will fall below the actual. We are interested in
comparing the correlations of CE and FOM to S the market surprise.
2.3 Unbiased Forecasts Benchmark: ω1 = 0
We begin with the unbiased benchmark. We can rewrite CE as
CE = S − 1
N
N∑
i=1
i.
where the the first term is the market surprise S and the second term of the average of the
individual forecast errors. It is easy then to directly compute the correlation of CE with the
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market surprise S:
Cor[CE, S] =
Cov[CE, S]√
Var[CE] · Var[S]
=
σ2A√
(σ2A +
σ2F
N
) · σ2A
=
1√
1 + r2F/N
, (7)
where rF = σF/σA is the ratio between the standard deviation of forecasts and the actual.
We can see that the correlation between CE and S increases with N and decreases with rF .
Indeed, as N gets large, Cor[CE, S] goes to 1 as one would expect from the Law of Large
Numbers.
We then rewrite FOM as:
FOM =
#{i < S} −#{i > S}
N
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
Mi, (8)
where
Mi =
 1 if i < S−1 if i > S (9)
If we work out the math,
Cov[FOM, S] = E[S(
1
N
N∑
i=1
Mi)]− E[S] · E[FOM]
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
E[S · (Ii<S − Ii>S)]
= E
[
S ·
(
Φ(
S
σF
)−
(
1− Φ( S
σF
)
))]
= 2σFE[X · Φ(X)], (10)
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where Φ(·) is the cdf of standard normal and X ∼ N (0, 1/r2F ). Similarly,
Var[FOM] =
4
N
E[Φ(X)(1− Φ(X))] + 4Var[Φ(X)]. (11)
Combining (10) and (11), we have
Cor[FOM, S] =
rFE[X · Φ(X)]√
E[Φ(X)(1− Φ(X))]/N + Var[Φ(X)] , (12)
where X ∼ N (0, 1/r2F ). It is worth noting that (7) and (12) only depend on N and rF ,
namely the number of analysts and the ratio between the standard deviation of the forecasts
and the actual (rather than their respective uncertainty levels).
The comparison we want to make is between Cor[CE, S] and Cor[FOM, S]. We can prove
that in the case where N is big, Cor[CE, S] > Cor[FOM, S], thereby making CE a better
measure of the earnings surprise S than FOM.
Proposition 1: When there is no bias, Cor[CE, S] goes to 1 for any given rF as
N gets large, while Cor[FOM, S] goes to some value strictly less than 1.
The first half of Proposition 1 is obvious when we take N →∞ in (7) for any given rF .
To show the second half, first note that (12) goes to l(rF ) = rFE[X·Φ(X)]√
Var[Φ(X)]
as N → ∞. The
limit l(rF ) can be rewritten as Cov(X,Φ(X))√
Var(X)
√
Var(Φ(X))
, which is the correlation between a normal
random variable X and its transformation Φ(X). This takes the value 1 if and only if
Φ(X) = a+ b ·X for some constants a and b, however using integration by parts
Φ(X) =
1
2
+
1√
2pi
e−X
2/2
∞∑
k=0
X2k+1
(2k + 1)!
,
which is nonlinear in X. Therefore l(rF ) must be strictly less than 1. In other words, for N
large and when there is no bias, CE is a better measure of S than FOM.
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While it is analytically difficult to prove, we show using numerical calculations that
Cor[CE, S] > Cor[FOM, S] as one would expect when ω1 = 0.
2.4 Biased Forecasts: ω1 6= 0
To see more directly how bias might affect its correlation with S, we can compute the
correlation of CE with S:
Cor[CE, S] =
1√
1 + (r2F + ω0ω1r
2
B + ω1r
2
b )/N + ω
2
1r
2
B
, (13)
where rB = σB/σA and rb = σb/σA is the ratio between the standard deviation of the bias
(aggregated or individual level) and the actual. The correlation between CE and S increases
with N and decreases with rF , rB, rb and ω1.
Similar calculations to those leading to (12) yields a formula for the correlation of FOM
with S:
Cor[FOM, S] =
rFE[X · Φω(X, Y )]√
E[Φω(X, Y )(1− Φω(X, Y ))]/N + Var[Φω(X, Y )]
, (14)
where Φω(X, Y ) = ω0Φ(X) + ω1Φ(X˜ − Y ), X˜ = X√
1+r2b/r
2
F
, X ∼ N (0, 1/r2F ), and Y ∼
N (0, r2B
r2F+r
2
b
) independent of X. The correlation between FOM and S also increases with N ,
but its relationship with other parameters is more involved, which we study in more detail
in the Appendix.
We are here simply interested in establishing that FOM does improve over CE in the
sense that its correlation with S is higher when biased forecasts are sufficiently large. To
show that, first observe
Cov[FOM, S] = 2ω0σFE[X · Φ(X)] + 2ω1σFE[X · Φ(X˜ − Y )], (15)
where the first term is ω0 times what we have in (10), the positive relationship under the ideal
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setting. The second term is non-negative because X and Φ(X˜ − Y ) are both monotonically
increasing in X when given Y and must have positive covariance. Therefore,
Cov[FOM, S] ≥ 2ω0σFE[X · Φ(X)]
= ω0 · Cov[FOM, S|ω1 = 0]. (16)
This means the covariance is at least a fraction of that in the ideal case. The more unbi-
ased forecasts (the larger ω0), the more positive relationship preserved. Consequently, the
correlation between FOM and S is bounded from below
Cor[FOM, S] =
Cov[FOM, S]√
Var[FOM] · Var[S]
≥ 2ω0σFE[X · Φ(X)]
σA ·
√
Var[FOM]
≥ 2ω0rFE[X · Φ(X)], (17)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that the variance of any bounded random
variable in [a, b] is at most (b − a)2/4 and FOM takes value between −1 and 1. The above
discussion leads to our following important conclusion.
Proposition 2: When there is bias (0 < ω1 < 1), Cor[CE, S] goes to 0 as rB gets
large, while Cor[FOM, S] is always bounded from below by some positive value.
The first claim follows from (13) by letting the bias distortion parameter rB →∞. On the
other hand, the lower bound for Cor[FOM, S] is given by l(rF , ω0) = 2ω0rFE[X · Φ(X)] > 0
as in (17). Although very crude, it does not involve the bias components: no matter how
bad the bias can be, at least a fraction of useful information is preserved. Since Cor[CE, S]
goes to 0 with increasing rB, for any value of ω1 ∈ (0, 1) it will decrease to below l(rF , ω0)
for a large enough rB. That is, whatever value other parameters take, FOM will eventually
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outperform CE as the level of bias distortion increases.
3 Data
The data on analysts’ earnings estimates are taken from the Institutional Brokers Estimate
System (I/B/E/S). We conduct our analysis on the Unadjusted Detailed files. We focus
on forecasts of the fiscal year-end earnings (FY1) for 1983 to 2011 as our base. Stock
returns, prices, and number of outstanding shares are drawn from the Center for Research
in Securities Prices (CRSP) Daily Stocks file. The forecast data are further merged with
actual earnings obtained from I/B/E/S and the CRSP daily stock data. Observations are
dropped if forecast data, earnings data, or stock data are missing.
To calculate the summary statistics of analysts’ forecast, we first extend each forecast
until its revision date.2 For each analyst in a given forecast period, we restrict every forecast
to be made within 90 days to the annual earnings announcements. If an analyst makes more
than one forecast within 90 days to the earnings announcement, we keep the latest forecast
before the announcements. In some record, the revision date precedes the original forecast
announcement date, which is considered an error on the part of I/B/E/S. In this case, we use
the original announcement date. We then calculate the mean, standard deviation, median,
minimum and maximum value of these individual forecasts for each stock in a given fiscal
period. This gives us one entry corresponding to each earnings announcement. In addition,
the FY1 earnings announcements need to fall between 15 to 90 calendar days following the
fiscal period end date. Otherwise, we drop the observations.3
We remove penny stocks with a price of less than $5. To further control for the stock
2There are some rare cases when an analyst makes two different forecasts that have the same revision
date. In this case, we rely on the forecast announcement date. Moreover, if the announcement date of
forecast i equals the revision date for forecast j, we use the forecast i. Also, if announcement date of forecast
i equals that of forecast j, we take the average value of the two forecasts.
3We also consider forecasts of quarterly earnings of the same sample period as a robustness exercise. We
also extend each forecast until the revision date. For each analyst in a given forecast period, we keep the
latest forecast before the quarterly earnings announcements. Relevant summary statistics based on qualified
quarterly forecasts are then calculated. Similarly, the quartelry earnings announcements need to fall between
15 to 90 calendar days following the fiscal period end date.
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split, we delete observations where the number of shares outstanding at date t when the
variables are calculated is larger than the number of shares 20 days prior to the earnings
announcement.
Following the literature, we define consensus error (CE) as the difference between the
actual FY1 earnings and the consensus forecast scaled by the stock price 20 days prior to
the earnings announcement (price(-20)). We consider both mean consensus (arithmetic mean
across individual forecasts) and median consensus (50th percentile of individual forecasts) in
formulating CE. We sort CE into deciles and assign a rank score from 1 to 10 to CE based
on mean consensus. As for CE based on median consensus, which has a value of 0 for over
20% of the data, we apply a more coarse sort by ranking CE into only 6 groups. Analyst
forecast dispersion (DISP) is defined as the standard deviation of analyst forecast scaled by
price(−20). We further sort DISP into deciles and assign a rank score from 1 to 10 to each
batch (Rank(DISP)).
We use two indicator functions, IActual<All and IActual>All, to denote when all analysts
completely miss on the same side. IActual<All equals 1 if the minimum forecast is higher than
the actual earnings. In this case, all analysts are being too positive and make forecasts higher
than the actual earnings. In contrast, IActual>All equals 1 if all analysts are too pessimistic
and the maximum forecast is lower than the actual earnings.
The fraction of misses (FOM) is defined as follows:
FOM =
K
N
− M
N
, (18)
where K is the number of forecasts strictly smaller than the actual earnings, and M is the
number of forecast strictly greater than the actual earnings. N is the total number of analyst
forecasts for stock i in fiscal period y. Notice that K + M doesn’t necessarily equal N. By
construction, FOM equals 1 if IActual>All is 1 and -1 if IActual<All is 1.
Using CRSP, we calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) as follows:
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CAR(i, y) =
t1∏
t=t0
(R(i, t)−R(p, t)), (19)
where R(i, t) is the daily returns of stock i on date t around earnings announcement in year
y. The window to calculate the cumulative abnormal return begins at date t0 and ends at
date t1. R(p, t) is the daily return of the size portfolio to which stock i belongs. The size
deciles are based on CRSP Portfolio Statistics Capitalization Deciles file.
We concentrate on two time windows relative to earnings announcements. The first are
returns cumulative over the three-day window from one trading day before until one day
after the earnings release date (CAR). The second is the cumulative post-announcement
returns (POSTCAR) using trading days +2 to +126 relative to earnings announcement.
Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the variables. In Panel A, notice that the
CE (using the mean consensus) has a mean of -.0031, consistent with the positive bias in
the consensus forecast found in the literature, and a standard deviation of .043. The CE
using the median consensus has similar magnitudes. Rank(CE) using mean consensus has
a mean of 5.49 and a standard deviation of 2.87. Rank(CE) using median consensus has
a mean of 3.46 and a standard deviation of 1.7.4 Our FOM has a mean of .1454 and a
standard deviation of .7. IActual<All has a mean of .12451 and IActual>All has a mean of
.2. In other words, around 32% of the earnings announcement observations in our sample,
everyone misses on the same side. Moreover, notice that CE based on either median or mean
consensus have a correlation of .8447. There is little difference between these two consensus
measures.
In Figure 1, we plot the distribution of FOM across the entire sample. On the x-axis are
the bins for various values of FOM. Notice that nearly 12% of our sample is in the -1 bin
(which denotes IActual<All) and 20% in the 1 bin (which denotes IActual>All). For the bins in
the middle, we have a bin width of .25. The bins with positive FOM’s have around 10% each
4The standard deviation of the Rank(CE) using the median consensus is smaller because as we noted
above we only use 1-6 groups as opposed to 1-10 deciles. The reason is that the median consensus has around
20% of the observations concentrated at 0.
15
of the observations. The bins with negative FOM’s have a somewhat smaller representations
at around 5% each.
In Figure 2, we show the FOM distribution conditional on the number of analysts N .
When N = 5 to N = 9, which represents 53% of the sample observations, the fractions of
out of bounds is around 39%. The analogous number for N = 10 to N = 19, which is around
35% of the sample, is around 27%. The number for N ≥ 20, which is around 12% of the
sample, is around 19%. In all these situations, the fraction of out-of-bounds is a non-trivial
fraction of the observations.
In Figure 3, it is also interesting to see the time series of misses on the same side varies
over our period of study from 1983 to 2011. While the total misses on the same side is
consistently high at around 30%, the misses all above the actual has been steadily declining,
while the misses all below the actual has been increasing.
In Panel B, we report the correlation matrix for our variables of interest in which CE is
based on the mean consensus. Notice that the correlation of CE with Rank(CE) is around
0.28 and the correlation of FOM and CE is around .24. As we show in Section 6.2.2, CE
has extreme fat-tails which drive down these correlations. The correlation of FOM with
Rank(CE) is higher at 0.81 but it is far from perfectly correlated. As a result, it will be
interesting to see which of these is more informative for stock returns. We will in our model
below try to capture this difference in correlations. In either event, FOM will have different
information about market surprises than CE and Rank(CE). Results in Panel C using the
median as the consensus forecast are similar. One thing to note is that the outliers make
CE not as effective a measure of market surprises as Rank(CE). But FOM does better than
both.
In Table 2, we provide a real world example in the spirit of the example given in the
Introduction. There are two stocks with ticker symbols CRS and TIF. Notice that the FOM
is 1 in both cases (a big positive surprise under our measure) but their Rank(CE) differ by 2
ranks. Yet, their CAR and POSTCAR do not differ. This example supports our view that
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substantial variation in CE or Rank(CE) is driven by bias as opposed to true surprises. As a
result, the coarser grouping of FOM = 1 or i.e. everyone misses too low is a better predictor
of the market’s reaction, which indicates that they are equally surprised.
It is also useful to do a decomposition of FOM on firm and time characteristics. In a
table which we omit for brevity, we report the R2 of FOM regressions on firm and year
dummies. We consider three models: (1) FOM on firm dummies only, (2) FOM on year
dummies only, and (3) FOM on firm and year dummies. The R2 for specification (1) is
.12, for specification (2) is .045, and for specification (3) is .14. In other words, firm fixed
effects or year dummies explain little of the variation in FOM. FOM is mostly driven by
idiosyncratic events, consistent with the premise of our model.
4 Empirical Findings
4.1 FOM and CAR
In Table 3, we run the canonical earnings announcement event study regression with CAR
as the dependent variable and various permutations of CE, FOM and IActual<All, IActual>All
measures. Included in all regressions are Year Dummies. In column (1), we see that the
coefficient on CE is positive as expected but the R2 is low, at around .3%. In column (2)
FOM attracts a coefficient of .0210 with a t-statistic of 33.86 and R2 of 4.1%. A one standard
deviation increase in FOM increases CAR by around 1.5%, which is a sizeable 3-day move
in stock returns. Using the everyone-misses-on-the-same-side measures, we find that the
coefficient in front of IActual<All is as expected negative with a coefficient of -.021 and a-
statistic of -15.21. For IActual>All , it is positive at .0265 with a t-statistic of 24.37. The
market’s reaction seems fairly symmetric when everyone missed on the same side, whether
it is too high or too low. Again, the market reactions are sizeable — roughly a 2% decrease
in stock prices over 3 days when all analysts miss too high and a 2.6% 3-day increase when
all analysts miss too low. In column (4), we find that FOM is far more informative for CAR
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than CE when we put both variables together in a multiple regression. The coefficient of CE
goes to zero while the coefficient in front of FOM is unchanged. It is in this sense that FOM
dominates CE. The same holds true in column (5) when we compare CE to the everyone
misses on the same side indicators.
In columns (6)-(10), we repeat the same specifications using the median of the forecasts
as the proxy for the consensus. In every case, the results are virtually unchanged. Using
the median consensus does not help for the reasons we gave above in that the issue is not so
much outliers but systemic bias which the median or winsorization more generally cannot
solve.
In Panel B, we compare the relative power of Rank(CE) and FOM for explaining CAR.
In column (1), we find that Rank(CE) attracts a coefficient of .004 with a t-statistic of 27.15.
The R2 is .028. As expected, it performs much better than CE because CE has outliers which
act as measurement error. The coefficient in column (2) for FOM is similar to that of Panel
A with an R2 of .041 which is higher than that of Rank(CE). The coefficients in front of
the everyone misses indicators in column (3) are similar to Panel A. In column (4), when
we combine both of these explanatory variables, we see that the coefficient in front FOM is
largely unchanged, falling from .021 to .0213 with a t-statistic of 20.45. The coefficient for
Rank(CE) is close to zero and is no longer significant. Moreover, the R2 remains the same as
when FOM is by itself in the regression. In column (5), we find that adding in a horserace of
Rank(CE) with the everyone misses indicators, Rank(CE) retains more explanatory power
but the indicators are still very significant, suggesting indeed that the everyone missed on
the same side indicators are capturing information because bias in forecasts contaminates
and distorts even the Rank(CE).
In columns (6)-(10), we consider Rank(CE) but using the median as the consensus fore-
cast. The coefficient in front of Rank(CE) is .008 with a t-statistic of 30.84 and an R2
of .035, which is better than the Rank(CE) using mean forecasts. But when we combine
Rank(CE) with FOM, we see again that the coefficient in front of Rank(CE) falls .00218
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with a t-statistic of .0028, while the coefficient in front of FOM is .0164 with a t-statistic of
13.89. One way to compare the economic magnitudes is to ask how a one standard deviation
increase in Rank(CE) or FOM increases the CAR. For Rank(CE), its standard deviation is
1.7, while for FOM , it is .72. The implied CAR effect of Rank(CE) is just .0038 compared
to the implied CAR effect for FOM, which is .014. The FOM effect is 3 to 4 times as large as
the Rank(CE) using median forecast effect. It is not surprising that the R2 does not change
much from the FOM univariate case when we add Rank(CE). In column (10), we show the
Rank(CE) and the everyone misses indicators. The results are similar to the case of the
mean consensus. So overall, while the median consensus helps in conjunction with taking
a rank of these medians, FOM is still the best univariate measure by a substantial margin.
This will become even more apparent when we consider POSTCAR next.
But before then, it is helpful to visualize these regressions in Figure 4, where we plot the
average CAR for different Rank(CE) and in Figure 5, where we plot the average CAR for the
different bins of FOM. Notice that an effective earnings surprise measure should generate
a strong positive monotonic relationship between the measure on the x-axis CAR on the
y-axis. In both cases, we see an upward sloping sloping curve. But FOM actually generates
a much bigger spread in CAR than Rank(CE)—from bin -1 to bin 1, we see a movement in
the CAR of -.021 to .0265, consistent with our estimates for everyone missed on the same
side indicators from Table 3. In contrast, Rank(CE) only generates an analogous movement
from decile 1 to decile 10 of -.015 to .02 in CAR. Also, Rank(CE) generates a much more
muted increase in CAR for deciles scores 1 to 3.
4.2 FOM and POSTCAR
In Table 4, we have as the dependent variable POSTCAR. In Panel A, we compare FOM to
the unranked CE. In column (1), we see that CE again attracts a positive coefficient of .606
but is not statistically significant. In column (2), the coefficient in front of FOM is .0135
with a t-statistic of 6.27. In column (3), we see that the coefficients in front of the indicators
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where everyone misses on the same side are -.0137 with a t-statistic of 2.87 and .0151 with
a t-statistic of 3.83. These two coefficients are particularly economically interesting since
we can interpret these as the returns of shorting a portfolio where everyone misses too high
(negative surprise) and longing a portfolio where everyone misses too low (positive surprise).
The four-month return is around 3%, which translates to an annualized return of around
9%, quite an economically interesting magnitude. When we run the multiple regression,
we see that FOM is more informative about POSTCAR than CE. The coefficient in front
of CE gets cut dramatically, while the coefficient in front of FOM is virtually unchanged.
In column (4), we find that FOM best explains POSTCAR. A similar conclusion holds in
column (5) with the everyone missed on the same side indicators. In column (6)-(10), we
use the median forecast to create CE and find virtually identical results.
In Panel B, we compare FOM to the Rank(CE) using means and medians for explaining
the POSTCAR. In column (1), we see that Rank(CE) comes in significantly with coefficient
of .000188 and a t-statistic of 3.45. Columns (2) and (3) are similar to those in Panel A.
In column (4), where we combine Rank(CE) and FOM, Rank(CE) is actually the wrong
sign, while the FOM is even more significant and in the right direction. The coefficient is
.0229 with a t-statistic of 5.98. So here moving from an FOM of -1 to 1 would lead to
an increase in the POSTCAR of nearly 5% per four months or nearly 15% annualized. In
column (5) where we examine how the indicators of everyone-missing-on-the-same-side do
compared to Rank(CE), we see that Rank(CE) is no longer significant and the coefficient
in front of the indicators are virtually unchanged. In columns (6)-(10), we use the median
forecast to construct Rank(CE) instead of the mean forecast and find very similar results. So
for POSTCAR as for CAR, FOM is much better than Rank(CE) in explaining its variability.
To visualize these POSTCAR regressions, we show in Figure 6 the average POSTCAR
for different Rank(CE) and in Figure 7 the average POSTCAR for the different bins of
FOM. Again, we want our earnings surprise measure to generate a monotonic or upward
sloping POSTCAR. Notice that FOM generates a much more upward-sloping and monotonic
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POSTCAR than Rank(CE) and also generates a much more sizeable spread in POSTCAR,
consistent with Table 4.
4.3 Controlling for Dispersion of Forecasts
In Table 5, we add into our baseline regression specifications the dispersion of analysts’
forecasts (DISP) and CE interacted with DISP to see if more complicated models of CE
might take away the explanatory power of FOM. Note that we have already established the
power of FOM over CE and Rank(CE) in all cases. It is interesting to nonetheless consider
whether more complicated Rank(CE) models might attenuate the univariate power of FOM.
More precisely, we implement our regression using Rank(DISP) and Rank(CE). The idea
is that the effect of CE on returns is lower when there is more uncertainty or disagreement
in the forecasts. This is indeed what we find since the coefficient in front of the interaction
term with DISP is negative. However, the coefficients on FOM are little changed from
before. The coefficients in front of IActual<All and IActual>All are still significant but in the
case of POSTCAR’s are less so. This is true both for mean and median consensus forecasts.
Nonetheless, the overall picture is that FOM remains significant throughout.
4.4 Cuts by Analyst Coverage
In Table 6, we run our baseline specifications for stocks of different number of analyst fore-
casts in comparing FOM and Rank(CE) for explaining CAR. Recall that we require a
minimum of 5 analysts to begin with. We divide out sample into 4 groups: from 5 to 9 ana-
lysts, 10 to 14 analysts, 15 to 19 analysts and greater than or equal to 20 analysts. In Panel
A, we consider the mean consensus. In the first row, we see that the effect of Rank(CE)
is fairly similar across all the sub-groups. FOM also has fairly similar effects for all the
sub-groups in the second row. But notice that in each case, the R2 of FOM is higher than
that of Rank(CE). So the baseline effects we establish are not concentrated in a particular
sub-sample. The same applies for the everyone misses on the same side indicators in the third
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row. In fourth row, we run a horse race between Rank(CE) and FOM and find again that
Rank(CE) is not significant in any of the sub-groups once we have FOM in the regression.
The coefficients on FOM are in contrast unchanged. In the fifth row, we run a horse race of
Rank(CE) and the everyone misses on the same side indicators. We obtain similar effects to
the baseline, the Rank(CE) is weakened but not as much as if we had FOM.
In Panel B, we conduct the same analysis but now using median consensus to calculate
Rank(CE). Our conclusions are largely the same. Interestingly, focusing on row (4) where
we run a horserace between Rank(CE) and FOM, we see that FOM does much better and
Rank(CE) is insignificant except for the N equals 5 to 9 case. In other words, recall from our
Table 3 Panel B that the Rank(CE) using median forecast did slightly better compared to
the Rank(CE) using mean forecast compared to FOM. Whereas Rank(CE) using the mean
forecast was entirely wiped out in the horserace, Rank(CE) median survived a bit though
the FOM effect was three times as big. We see here that this differential was coming only
from the group with the fewest analysts. For N big, FOM is much better which fits with
the intuition we developed in the model. When there is a big N , if everyone misses on the
same side, it is very indicative that there was a big surprise since even the unbiased forecasts
must are also missing on the same side. Recall that for CE the fraction of biased forecasts
stays constant with N and hence bias remains just as important for N big.
In Table 7, we consider the same exercise but using POSTCAR. Here the results are
noisier but we can still discern that FOM is much more robust than Rank(CE) in explaining
POSTCAR. In Panel A,we again use the mean forecast to calculate Rank(CE). Notice in the
first row, Rank(CE) is only sporadically significant across the four sub-groups. FOM in the
second row is much more consistent in its performance. In the third row, the indicators for
everyone-missing-on-the-same-side are also less consistent compared to FOM. In the fourth
row, we see that FOM takes out the significance of Rank(CE) in explaining POSTCAR. The
only significant coefficient for Rank(CE) goes the wrong way in the first sub-group.
However, for N greater than or equal to 20, even FOM has limited explanatory power. So
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most of the power of FOM is coming from stocks with fewer analysts. This is not surprising
since Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) documented that there was far less drift in stock prices
for stocks with more analyst coverage since these stocks are more efficiently priced. The
reason FOM is not working for the POSTCAR is that there is not much drift in prices or
inefficiency to begin with for this group. Of course, also note that FOM does work very well
for the sub-group with lots of analysts using CAR since this captures the reaction of the
market to the surprise. The POSTCAR is the delayed reaction or inefficiency in the market.
In Panel B, we reach very similar conclusions for the POSTCAR.
4.5 FOM and Revision of Consensus
In Table 8, we compare the relative performance of Rank(CE) and FOM in explaining
revisions of analysts expectations (between two adjacent fiscal years) in the same direction
as market returns. In other words, if both Rank(CE) and FOM are picking up surprises, we
should see that positive surprises are followed by positive revisions of the consensus forecast.
But when it comes to comparing which is more powerful, any conclusion becomes more
involved since we know from our analysis that a subset of analyst forecasts are biased and
that these biased forecasts influence the consensus. So it really also depends on how the
biased analysts revise their expectations, which is difficult to say. In any event, we would
expect that since part of the consensus is unbiased and similar to the market, we expect
FOM to still have power to predict the revision of the consensus. This is indeed what
we find. If we look at the economic significance of the coefficients in front of Rank(CE)
and FOM and perform our comparative statics of one standard deviation shock to these
two variables and see what it implies for the consensus revision, we still find that FOM is
stronger than Rank(CE) in both Panels A and B. But the difference is far smaller than
when it comes to predicting stock returns. Nonetheless, it is comforting that FOM and the
everyone-misses-on-the-same-side indicators are picking up revisions of the consensus.
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4.6 Additional Robustness Exercises
In the Internet Supplementary Appendix, we provide additional results. In our baseline
results, we focus on forecasts for year-end earnings that has to be within 90 days before
the announcement date. In the Appendix we also report the results when there are no such
screen. We also provide results using quarterly instead of annual year-end earnings forecasts
and find very similar results. We also report results where the benchmark excess return is the
Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) returns accounting for size, book-to-market
and momentum. The results hardly differ from our size-adjusted returns.
5 Conclusion
Capital markets event studies are an important tool in financial economics research. The key
to these studies is capturing whether or not the market is surprised. The traditional measure
is the difference between realized earnings and the consensus forecast, defined as the average
or median of individual forecasts. We argue, however, that the fraction of forecasts that miss
on the same side often does a superior job of explaining stock returns than the consensus
error. We develop a model to show that the reason is that when analysts forecasts are biased
the consensus forecast is more sensitive to this bias than the fraction of same-sided misses.
While our paper has focused on earnings forecast, the methodology we have laid out can be
applied equally well to any type of forecasts such as on macro-variables. We believe that our
new methodology can be used to improve the precision of event studies of capital market
efficiency which are a most basic tool for economists.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Numerical Calculations and Extensions
In this section, we provide more color on how bias affects the relative performance of CE,
Rank(CE) and FOM and why FOM is a robust measure of surprises S.
6.1.1 Unbiased Forecasts Benchmark: ω1 = 0
We start with the unbiased benchmark. In the earlier model section, we had established
some results for N large but have also done extensive calculations over wide parameter
ranges. To evaluate their relative performance (CE compared to FOM), we can compute the
exact value of (7) and (12) for any given pair of parameters. Figure 8 shows the contour
plot of the correlation between CE and S minus the correlation between FOM and S (i.e.,
Cor[CE, S]− Cor[FOM, S]) as a function of rF and N . Although we cannot prove it in full
generality, we searched over a sufficiently large space with realistic parameter values and the
difference stays positive, so we conclude that CE is superior than FOM for practical use in
this ideal case.
The relative performance of CE and FOM changes with rF and N in a nonlinear manner.
But we can try to get some intuition and a flavor of what drives this difference in performance.
If we take a horizontal slice of this contour by fixingN , the difference is the smallest at around
rF = 1 and when rF is huge (see the bottom right corner). The intuition behind the first
observation is that FOM tries to gauge one realization of S by using N realized noise as a
benchmark, i.e., counting how many i’s are above or below it. If S and i’s have roughly
the same distribution, it gives the most accurate account for the location of S in its own
unobserved distribution. This in our case leads to rF = σF/σA ∼ 1 (the exact maximal point
depends on N). On the other hand, as rF increases, the correlation of both measures drop
and they become equally bad. Figure 9 shows the pattern when N = 10, which is rather
representative of different N ’s.
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6.1.2 Biased Forecasts: ω1 > 0
While CE can be large simply due to the existence of one very negative Fi, FOM is much
less affected because each observation only contributes as 1 or −1 in the sum (8) regardless
of its magnitude. One consequence is that CE and FOM are no longer highly correlated.
While we observe a rather low correlation (around 0.28) in earnings data, which is also due
to other reasons as we argue in Section 6.2.2, here we use simulations to reveal part of the
dynamic caused by biased forecasts. We simulate data according to the model and calculate
the correlations using 50, 000 samples, where the key parameters ω1 and rB vary over their
range, and the others fixed at N = 20, rF = 1/2 and rb = rB/5. Figure 10 shows how the
correlation decreases with rB, the relative uncertainty level of the bias component B. In
terms of ω1, recall it is the proportion of biased forecasts, so the correlation first decreases
with the introduction of biased forecasts as soon as ω1 becomes nonzero, and then picks up
when both measures get equally bad.
Along with the lower correlation between these two measures, the discrepancy between
their performance measuring market surprise also widens, mainly due to their different resis-
tance to bias. We have shown earlier (Proposition 2) that FOM will eventually outperform
CE as bias becomes more significant, because FOM’s correlation with S has a positive lower
bound whereas Cor(CE, S) can be reduced to zero quickly. Indeed this is what we observe in
simulation studies. As an illustration, again let the key parameters ω1 and rB vary over their
range, with the others fixed at rF = 1/2, rb = rB/5 and N = 20. We directly compute the
correlation between CE and S in (13) and simulate 100, 000 samples of X and Y to compute
the correlation between FOM and S in (14). Figure 11 shows a representative pattern of their
relative performance as a function of ω1 and rB, where the difference between Cor[CE, S]
and Cor[FOM, S] becomes negative (i.e., FOM outperforms) as the relative dispersion of bias
rB = σB/σA increases.
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6.1.3 CE and Rank(CE)
In practice, people use Rank(CE), i.e., sort CE into 10 deciles in order to be robust to outliers.
However, this global adjustment may not work in the presence of bias. For example, one
single large biased forecast can still move CE from decile 10 down to decile 1 and mess up the
ordering. Figure 12 shows a representative pattern of the difference in the performance of
Rank(CE) and FOM (i.e., Cor[Rank(CE), S]−Cor[FOM, S]) as a function of ω1 and rB with
the same set of parameters as in Section 6.1.2, where each Cor[Rank(CE), S] is computed
using 50,000 simulated samples. Comparing with Figure 11, there is some improvement when
rB is not too large. However, the essence of the analysis on CE carries over to Rank(CE)
because when CE is greatly contaminated, the coding of Rank(CE) does not help much: the
damage is already done. In this sense, FOM measure does the robustness adjustment on a
local level, so the impact from bias is alleviated when aggregating N forecasts, instead of
afterwards. Therefore, FOM improves over Rank(CE) for the same reason as it does over
CE, the reason being their sensitivity to large bias. That being said, Rank(CE) does have
better property when treating the few outliers that overthrow CE, and Section 6.2.2 develops
this aspect of the relationship between CE and Rank(CE) in an extended model.
6.2 Winsorized Mean and Median
In order to be robust to the noisy forecasts, one may also Winsorize the forecasts, for example,
a 5% Winsorization would set all forecasts below the 5th percentile set to the 5th percentile,
and data above the 95th percentile set to the 95th percentile. The average of the resulting
data is the Winsorized mean of forecasts. Similarly, we can define the Winsorized consensus
error as
CEwinλ = A− F¯winλ ,
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where λ is the percentage of data on each tail being replaced. Note that when λ = 50%, the
Winsorized mean becomes median:
CEwin50% = CEmed = A−median(Fi).
However, such measures do not show much, if any, improvement in our regression results of
earnings announcement event study. This is not surprising because although Winsorization is
designed to remove the two tails in a set of forecasts, it is by no means equivalent to removing
the biased ones. Since the realization of bias is unknown in each draw, it is impossible for
Winsorization to correctly pick up all the bad forecasts without sacrificing the good ones. In
the same spirit as the analysis of consensus errors, the Winsorized measures by definition still
strongly depend on the magnitude of forecasts, which inevitably leads to their vulnerability
to bias. The more volatile B is, the harder it is for Winsorization to achieve consistent
performance. Figure 13 illustrates how the performance drops with increasing rB through
5000 simulations, where the other parameters in the model are set as ω1 = 0.3, rF = 1/2,
rb = rB/5 and N = 20.
Furthermore, the performance also depends on the fraction of biased forecasts and the
choice of λ for Winsorization. Unfortunately, the fraction of biased forecasts ω1 is usually
unknown in practice and may even be varying, so it is hard if not impossible to set λ, the
single important parameter for Winsorization, and an inappproriate choice might result in
undesirable performance. This is illustrated in Figure 14, where the relative performance
of different Winsorized measures changes with the fraction of biased forecasts ω1, and the
other parameters in the model are set as rB = 10, rF = 1/2, rb = rB/5 and N = 20.
6.2.1 Remark on the Model
A key assumption in our model is that for each stock a fraction of analysts are biased.
Recall that under our modelling, the forecasts come from a mixture composed of two normal
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distributions, one centred around the unknown market expectation e and the other biased
by a magnitude of the realized B. While the aggregated bias magnitude B can be huge or
moderate, ω1 the weight of the biased distribution in the mixture is with respect to N so the
number of biased analysts scales with the total number and makes the law of large numbers
fail. In this normal mixture framework, the bias component is essential and we have shown
how it drives the behaviour of different measures that is consistent with our observations.
If we remove the bias part of the modelling and instead introduce bad forecasts by having
large variance in one of the distributions, it will fail to represent some important features in
the real data. More specifically, suppose the forecasts are given by
Fi = e+ i, (20)
where i’s follow a mixture of two normal distributions: N (0, σ20) with probability ω0 and
N (0, σ21) with probability ω1 = 1 − ω0, and σ21 > σ20. Notice that this is actually a limiting
case of our specification (3) by setting σB = 0, which means B is always 0 so that its impact
disappears. Under this alternative modelling, even though individual forecasts can be very
volatile, the variance of the average forecast error is given by:
Var[
1
N
N∑
i=1
i] =
1
N
(ω0σ
2
0 + ω1σ
2
1), (21)
so CE still converges to S by the law of large numbers. That is, although σ21 can be large,
the distortion from fat-tails is greatly discounted and the variance decreases linearly in N ,
unlike in (??) the second term never vanishes no matter how big N is. This implies that
CE or Rank(CE) should be better for larger N under the alternative model, which does not
quite match what we see in the real data (recall Table 6).
Furthermore, in the absence of random bias all the forecasts are centered around the real
market expectation e, so it is much easier for Winsorisation to filter the bad forecasts. As a
comparative example to Figure 13, Figure 15 illustrates the much stronger performance of
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Winsorized mean and median through 5000 simulations, which is again different from what
we see in the empirical study and undermines the validity of this alternative modelling.
6.2.2 Extension Allowing for Outliers in CE
Although by comparing Figure 11 and 12 we show that Rank(CE) has slight improvement
over CE, so far in our analysis they play a very similar role. Consequently, when our model
generates a low correlation between CE and FOM, Rank(CE) and FOM are also much
less correlated. However in real data we find the correlation between CE and Rank(CE)
is merely over 0.28, which leads to a low Cor(CE,FOM) around 0.24 and a rather high
Cor(Rank(CE),FOM) over 0.81. As we further delve into data, we find rare events when
most analysts or even everyone miss by quite a margin, which produces huge CE that has
a magnitude multiple times more than the regular majority (e.g., the 3% on two tails is 30
times of the central 97% in average absolute value). Note that our CE is scaled by stock
price and controlled for split, so this is not an issue about firm heterogeneity. These large
values are able to drive the correlation between CE and other measures down. For example,
Figure 16 shows how the extreme tails of CE diminish its covariation with Rank(CE) in the
regular region, that is, when we zoom in and conditional on Rank(CE) being 2 to 9 only,
the correlation bounces back to 0.72.
Recall that in our model ω1 is a constant and B follows a normal distribution, we clearly
are not able to generate the tail events of huge CE within a reasonable range of parameter
values. In order to close this gap with the real data, we introduce a tail event scenario with
a small probability. That is, with probability 1 − θ the forecasts follow the original model
as in (3); with probability θ which is supposed to be very small, all the forecasts are off by
a magnitude possibly huge:
Fi = e+ b˜i + i, i = 1, · · · , N (22)
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where i ∼ N (0, σ2F ), and conditional on B˜ ∼ N (0, σ2B˜), we have b˜i ∼ N (B˜, σ2b ). σB˜ should be
large relatively to σB, and we use σB˜ = 30·σB which seems a reasonable scale to represent the
real data. As argued above, this formulation helps to explain the low correlation between
CE and Rank(CE) as well as FOM, and its poor performance as a proxy of the market
surprise S. On the other hand, the impact on Rank(CE) and FOM is very limited as long as
θ is small. Since huge values of CE only translate to the boundary points in Rank(CE) and
FOM, their distortion is not magnified by the magnitude. By a similar argument as in the
case of FOM with respect to biased forecasts, the behaviour of Rank(CE) and FOM should
not deviate too much from their respective θ = 0 case.
We now confirm our hypothesis through simulation studies. Throughout this section, the
correlations are computed using 100, 000 simulated samples for each pair of parameters θ
and rB, with the others fixed at ω1 = 0.3, rF = 1/2, rb = rB/5 and N = 20. Figure 17 and
18 show how the correlation between CE and other measures decreases dramatically with
the introduction of θ. On the other hand, the relationship between Rank(CE) and FOM are
rather stable, indicated by the horizontal stripes in Figure 19. In terms of the performance
as a proxy of market surprise, the gap between FOM and CE widens because of the tail
scenario that undermines CE (Figure 20), while the improvement of FOM over Rank(CE)
remains as in θ = 0 case (Figure 21).
6.3 Extended Model
Our model above assumes that the market’s expectation conditions on information outside
the set of analyst forecasts. But we can model the market’s expectation as dependent just
on the set of analysts’ forecasts and obtain the same results.
Suppose now that A ∼ N(0, σ2A) for simplicity. There are i = 1, ..., N forecasts. We then
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assume that individual forecasts i is given by
Fi =
 A+ i with prob. ω0A+ bi + i with prob. ω1 = 1− ω0 (23)
where i ∼ N (0, σ2F ) and is uncorrelated with A. Each forecast is unbiased with probability
ω0, and is contaminated by an individual bias term bi with probability ω1 = 1 − ω0. We
model the bias in the same manner as before. For each set of N forecasts an aggregated
bias level B ∼ N (0, σ2B) is drawn first, and conditional on this realized B individual bias bi
follows N (B, σ2b ).
We assume that investors are able to de-bias whereas the econometrician cannot. Hence,
the market’s posterior of A is given by
Aˆ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
F ∗i , (24)
where F ∗i = A + i is the debiased forecasts. This follows from the usual Kalman Filtering
results in linear-normal models where each forecast can be interpreted as a linear signal of
the actual A. Since each signal has equal precision, there is then equal weighting of the
signals in forming the posterior Aˆ. The market surprise then is given by
S = A− Aˆ (25)
Notice that CE is now given by
CE = A− 1/N
N∑
i=1
Fi (26)
and FOM is now given by
FOM =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(IF1<A − IFi>A) (27)
We want to compare again the correlation of CE and FOM with the market surprise S,
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respectively,
We can calculate that
Cor(CE, S) =
1√
1 + ω0ω1r2B + ω1r
2
b + ω
2
1r
2
BN
(28)
where rB = σB/σF and rb = σb/σF . We can also show that
Cor(FOM,S) =
ω0
1√
2pi
+ ω1E[XΦ(X˜ − Y )]√
ω0
2
(1− ω0
2
) + ω21E[Φ(X˜ − Y )(1− Φ(X˜ − Y ))] + Var[Φ(X˜ − Y )]
(29)
where X ∼ N(0, 1) and X˜ = X/rb which is orthogonal to Y ∼ N(0, r
2
B
r2b
).
Since Cor(FOM,S) ≥ w0
√
2/pi√
1+ω21N
, it follows then that if rB gets large, then Cor(CE, S)
drops below Cor(FOM,S). This then confirms our results in our baseline model.
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Table 1 (cont’d): Summary Statistics
Panel B: Correlation matrix (CE based on mean consensus)
CE DISP Rank(CE) Rank(DISP) FOM IActual<All IActual>All
CE 1
DISP -0.5184 1
Rank(CE) 0.284 -0.0414 1
Rank(DISP) -0.1015 0.138 -0.1175 1
FOM 0.2414 -0.0402 0.8103 -0.1881 1
IActual<All -0.247 0.0195 -0.4774 0.073 -0.6032 1
IActual>All 0.1305 -0.0291 0.5317 -0.1722 0.597 -0.1896 1
Panel C: Correlation matrix (CE based on median consensus)
CE DISP Rank(CE) Rank(DISP) FOM IActual<All IActual>All
CE 1
DISP -0.124 1
Rank(CE) 0.2853 -0.025 1
Rank(DISP) -0.1002 0.138 -0.0547 1
FOM 0.2672 -0.0402 0.8473 -0.1881 1
IActual<All -0.2746 0.0195 -0.4709 0.073 -0.6032 1
IActual>All 0.1357 -0.0291 0.5231 -0.1722 0.597 -0.1896 1
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Table 2: An Example: When CE and CAR (POSTCAR) are at odds and FOM
does a better job.
In this table we hand pick two stocks, which have fairly different CE. By having equal FOM, the CAR and
POSTCAR are shown to be similar.
Ticker = CRS Ticker = TIF
Fiscal period = 6/30/2003 Fiscal period = 1/31/1999
EA date = 7/24/2003 EA date = 3/3/1999
EPS = 0.17 EPS = 2.51
Analyst Forecast date Forecast Analyst Forecast date Forecast
1 5/28/2003 0.01 1 1/11/1999 2.45
2 6/5/2003 -0.01 2 1/11/1999 2.42
3 7/9/2003 0.01 3 1/8/1999 2.44
4 7/22/2003 0.050000001 4 1/13/1999 2.40
5 6/9/2003 -0.06 5 1/8/1999 2.42
6 1/11/1999 2.44
7 1/8/1999 2.42
8 1/8/1999 2.45
9 1/11/1999 2.35
10 1/8/1999 2.42
11 1/11/1999 2.45
12 1/11/1999 2.44
13 1/12/1999 2.42
14 1/8/1999 2.43
15 2/5/1999 2.35
16 1/14/1999 2.45
17 1/11/1999 2.45
18 2/25/1999 2.35
Mean consensus 0.00 Mean consensus 2.42
CE 0.0109 CE 0.0016
Rank(CE) 10 Rank(CE) 8
FOM 1 FOM 1
CAR 0.1171 CAR 0.1236
POSTCAR 0.4376 POSTCAR 0.4609
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Table 6: Number of Analysts, CAR, FOM, out-of-bound dummies, and Rank(CE)
This table presents the ordinary least squares estimates of the sensitivity of earnings announcement stock
returns (CAR) to Rank(CE), FOM, IActual<All, and IActual>All by further classifying stocks into 4 groups
based on the number of analyst coverage. Group 1 includes stocks with 5 to 9 analysts, group 2 is 10 to 14,
group 3 is 15 to 19, and group 4 is stocks with more than 20 analysts. The dependent variable is CAR. The
independent variables are Rank(CE), FOM, IActual<All, and IActual>All, as defined in Table 3. In Panel A,
Rank(CE) is calculated based on mean consensus. In panel B, Rank(CE) is based on median consensus. All
standard errors are clustered by stocks. t statistics are in parentheses.
Panel A: Rank(CE) is based on mean consensus
N = 5 to 9 N = 10 to 14 N = 15 to 19 N ≥ 20
(1) Rank(CE) 0.00465*** 0.00420*** 0.00356*** 0.00282***
(22.03) (12.54) (8.28) (7.92)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.032 0.026 0.019 0.018
N 18,405 7,929 4,201 4,324
(2) FOM 0.0226*** 0.0213*** 0.0187*** 0.0153***
(26.77) (16.04) (11.32) (10.72)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.044 0.040 0.034 0.032
N 18,405 7,929 4,201 4,324
(3) IActual<All -0.0210*** -0.0218*** -0.0271*** -0.0133***
(-11.84) (-6.33) (-5.74) (-3.85)
IActual>All 0.0272*** 0.0287*** 0.0202*** 0.0222***
(18.54) (12.88) (6.80) (7.60)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.038 0.036 0.025 0.020
N 18,405 7,929 4,201 4,324
(4) Rank(CE) 0.000188 -0.000345 -0.000909 -0.000804
(0.52) (-0.63) (-1.13) (-1.43)
FOM 0.0219*** 0.0224*** 0.0216*** 0.0179***
(15.01) (10.26) (6.94) (7.80)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.044 0.040 0.034 0.032
N 18,405 7,929 4,201 4,324
(5) Rank(CE) 0.00212*** 0.00184*** 0.00179*** 0.00175***
(7.56) (4.56) (3.54) (4.30)
IActual<All -0.0138*** -0.0152*** -0.0206*** -0.00697
(-7.04) (-4.11) (-4.09) (-1.91)
IActual>All 0.0198*** 0.0227*** 0.0146*** 0.0167***
(11.34) (8.85) (4.40) (5.20)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.041 0.038 0.028 0.024
N 18,405 7,929 4,201 4,324
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Table 6 (cont’d): Number of Analysts, CAR, FOM, out-of-bound dummies, and
Rank(CE)
Panel B: Rank(CE) based on median consensus
N = 5 to 9 N = 10 to 14 N = 15 to 19 N ≥ 20
(1) Rank(CE) 0.00869*** 0.00808*** 0.00712*** 0.00562***
(24.57) (14.59) (9.84) (9.56)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.039 0.034 0.028 0.025
N 18,405 7,929 4,201 4,324
(2) FOM 0.0226*** 0.0213*** 0.0187*** 0.0153***
(26.77) (16.04) (11.32) (10.72)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.044 0.040 0.034 0.032
N 18,405 7,929 4,201 4,324
(3) IActual<All -0.0210*** -0.0218*** -0.0271*** -0.0133***
(-11.84) (-6.33) (-5.74) (-3.85)
IActual>All 0.0272*** 0.0287*** 0.0202*** 0.0222***
(18.54) (12.88) (6.80) (7.60)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.038 0.036 0.025 0.020
N 18,405 7,929 4,201 4,324
(4) Rank(CE) 0.00258*** 0.00186 0.00147 0.000241
(3.70) (1.84) (1.07) (0.21)
FOM 0.0171*** 0.0174*** 0.0156*** 0.0148***
(10.25) (7.15) (5.01) (5.25)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.045 0.040 0.034 0.032
N 18,405 7,929 4,201 4,324
(5) Rank(CE) 0.00532*** 0.00482*** 0.00480*** 0.00423***
(11.47) (7.35) (5.85) (6.28)
IActual<All -0.0104*** -0.0117** -0.0166*** -0.00402
(-5.30) (-3.17) (-3.36) (-1.09)
IActual>All 0.0164*** 0.0193*** 0.0114*** 0.0146***
(9.53) (7.61) (3.50) (4.57)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.045 0.042 0.034 0.029
N 18,405 7,929 4,201 4,324
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Table 7: Number of Analysts, POSTCAR, FOM, out-of-bound dummies, and
Rank(CE)
This table presents the ordinary least squares estimates of the sensitivity of post earnings announcement
stock returns to Rank(CE), FOM, IActual<All, and IActual>All by further classifying stocks into 4 groups
based on the number of analyst coverage. Group 1 includes stocks with 5 to 9 analysts, group 2 is 10
to 14, group 3 is 15 to 19, and group 4 is stocks with more than 20 analysts. The dependent variable is
POSTCAR. The independent variables are Rank(CE), FOM, IActual<All, and IActual>All, as defined in
Table 4. In Panel A, Rank(CE) is calculated based on mean consensus. In panel B, Rank(CE) is based on
median consensus. All standard errors are clustered by stocks. t statistics are in parentheses.
Panel A: Rank(CE) based on mean consensus
N = 5 to 9 N = 10 to 14 N = 15 to 19 N ≥ 20
(1) Rank(CE) 0.00170* 0.00223 0.00144 0.00282*
(2.16) (1.88) (0.98) (2.20)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.020
N 17,696 7,659 4,075 4,214
(2) FOM 0.0143*** 0.0143** 0.0121* 0.0110*
(4.60) (3.05) (2.16) (2.25)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.020
N 17,696 7,659 4,075 4,214
(3) IActual<All -0.0125 -0.0210* -0.0137 -0.00796
(-1.93) (-1.98) (-0.89) (-0.67)
IActual>All 0.0183*** 0.0132 0.00205 0.00992
(3.32) (1.67) (0.20) (0.94)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.019
N 17,696 7,659 4,075 4,214
(4) Rank(CE) -0.00401** -0.00203 -0.00332 0.00173
(-2.84) (-1.03) (-1.29) (0.79)
FOM 0.0281*** 0.0210** 0.0230* 0.00540
(5.06) (2.73) (2.33) (0.65)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.020
N 17,696 7,659 4,075 4,214
(5) Rank(CE) -0.00124 0.000426 0.00110 0.00290
(-1.11) (0.28) (0.60) (1.86)
IActual<All -0.0167* -0.0195 -0.00968 0.00258
(-2.25) (-1.63) (-0.58) (0.20)
IActual>All 0.0227*** 0.0118 -0.00140 0.000805
(3.38) (1.28) (-0.12) (0.07)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.020
N 17,696 7,659 4,075 4,214
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Table 7 (cont’d): Number of Analysts, POSTCAR, FOM, out-of-bound dummies,
and Rank(CE)
Panel B: Rank(CE) based on median consensus
N = 5 to 9 N = 10 to 14 N = 15 to 19 N ≥ 20
(1) Rank(CE) 0.00419** 0.00477* 0.00394 0.00550*
(3.17) (2.36) (1.58) (2.55)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.021
N 17,696 7,659 4,075 4,214
(2) FOM 0.0143*** 0.0143** 0.0121* 0.0110*
(4.60) (3.05) (2.16) (2.25)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.020
N 17,696 7,659 4,075 4,214
(3) IActual<All -0.0125 -0.0210* -0.0137 -0.00796
(-1.93) (-1.98) (-0.89) (-0.67)
IActual>All 0.0183*** 0.0132 0.00205 0.00992
(3.32) (1.67) (0.20) (0.94)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.019
N 17,696 7,659 4,075 4,214
(4) Rank(CE) -0.00392 -0.00138 -0.00178 0.00580
(-1.49) (-0.35) (-0.37) (1.34)
FOM 0.0226*** 0.0171 0.0158 -0.000834
(3.69) (1.90) (1.44) (-0.08)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.020
N 17,696 7,659 4,075 4,214
(5) Rank(CE) 0.000666 0.00245 0.00415 0.00597*
(0.37) (0.93) (1.34) (2.28)
IActual<All -0.0111 -0.0158 -0.00463 0.00519
(-1.52) (-1.34) (-0.28) (0.40)
IActual>All 0.0170** 0.00848 -0.00553 -0.000914
(2.58) (0.91) (-0.48) (-0.08)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.020
N 17,696 7,659 4,075 4,214
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Table 8: Sensitivity of forecast revision to Rank(CE), FOM, IActual<All and
IActual>All
This table presents the ordinary least squares estimates of the sensitivity of analysts’ forecast revision to
Rank(CE), FOM, IActual<All, and IActual>All. The dependent variable is the forecast revision (the difference
in mean (median) consensus between two adjacent fiscal years). The independent variables are Rank(CE)
(the rank score of consensus errors, from 1 to 10 for Rank(CE) based on mean consensus and 1 to 6 for
Rank(CE) based on median consensus), FOM ( KN − MN , where K (M) is the number of forecasts strictly
smaller (greater) than the actual earnings, and N is the total number of analysts), IActual<All (a dummy
variable which equals 1 when all analysts’ forecasts are higher than the actual earnings), and IActual>All
(a dummy variable which equals 1 when all analysts’ forecasts are lower than the actual earnings). 27,701
observations are in each of the regression models.
Panel A: Rank(CE) is based on mean consensus
(1) (3) (2) (5) (4)
Rank(CE) 0.189*** 0.121*** 0.165***
(27.27) (10.28) (18.22)
FOM 0.736*** 0.334***
(29.00) (7.78)
IActual<All -0.676*** -0.0992
(-11.60) (-1.53)
IActual>All 0.792*** 0.251***
(17.97) (4.89)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.035 0.033 0.021 0.037 0.036
Panel B: Rank(CE) is based on median consensus
(1) (3) (2) (5) (4)
Rank(CE) 0.182*** 0.103*** 0.155***
(26.63) (7.75) (17.47)
FOM 0.736*** 0.369***
(29.00) (7.57)
IActual<All -0.676*** -0.125
(-11.60) (-1.92)
IActual>All 0.792*** 0.283***
(17.97) (5.64)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.033 0.033 0.021 0.035 0.034
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Figure 1: The distribution of FOM over the whole sample. FOM is the fraction of misses
defined as K
N
− M
N
, where K(M) is the number of forecasts strictly smaller (greater) than the
actual earnings, and N is the total number of analysts.
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N = 5 to 9 (53% of whole sample)
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N = 10 to 19 (35% of whole sample)
0%
10%
−
1
(−1
,−0
.75
]
(−0
.75
,−0
.5]
(−0
.5,
−0
.25
]
(−0
.25
,0]
(0,
0.2
5]
(0.
25
,0.
5]
(0.
5,0
.75
]
(0.
75
,1) 1
N >= 20 (12% of whole sample)
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Figure 2: The distribution of FOM over the whole sample and conditional on different
number of analysts N . FOM is the fraction of misses defined as K
N
− M
N
, where K(M) is the
number of forecasts strictly smaller (greater) than the actual earnings, and N is the total
number of analysts.
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Figure 3: The time series of the percentage of misses on the same side.
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Figure 4: Average CAR against Rank(CE). CAR is the cumulative abnormal return from
trading day −1 to 1 around annual earnings announcement dates, and Rank(CE) is the rank
score 1 to 10 of consensus errors CE based on mean consensus.
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Figure 5: Average CAR against FOM. CAR is the cumulative abnormal return from trading
day −1 to 1 around annual earnings announcement dates, and FOM is the fraction of misses
defined as K
N
− M
N
, where K(M) is the number of forecasts strictly smaller (greater) than the
actual earnings, and N is the total number of analysts.
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Figure 6: Average POSTCAR against Rank(CE). POSTCAR is the cumulative abnormal
return from trading day 2 to 126 post annual earnings announcement dates, and Rank(CE)
is the rank score 1 to 10 of consensus errors CE based on mean consensus.
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Figure 7: Average POSTCAR against FOM. POSTCAR is the cumulative abnormal return
from trading day 2 to 126 post annual earnings announcement dates, and FOM is the fraction
of misses defined as K
N
− M
N
, where K(M) is the number of forecasts strictly smaller (greater)
than the actual earnings, and N is the total number of analysts.
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Figure 8: The contour plot of Cor[CE, S]−Cor[FOM, S] as a function of rF andN in unbiased
forecasts benchmark case. The contour value is the difference between the correlations of
consensus errors CE and fraction of misses FOM to S the market surprise, the y-axis is N the
number of analysts, and the x-axis is rF = σF/σA the ratio between the standard deviation
of forecasts and the actual (shown in log-scale).
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Figure 9: The comparison between the correlations of consensus errors CE and fraction
of misses FOM to S the market surprise as a function of rF for fixed number of analysts
N = 10, where rF = σF/σA is the ratio between the standard deviation of forecasts and the
actual (shown in log-scale).
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Figure 10: The contour plot of Cor[CE,FOM] as a function of the key parameters ω1 and
rB in biased forecasts case. The contour value is the correlation between consensus errors
CE and fraction of misses FOM, the y-axis is ω1 the proportion of biased forecasts, and
the x-axis is rB = σB/σA the ratio between the standard deviation of aggregated bias and
the actual (shown in log-scale). The other parameters in the model are set as rF = 1/2,
rb = rB/5 and N = 20.
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Figure 11: The contour plot of Cor[CE, S]− Cor[FOM, S] as a function of the key param-
eters ω1 and rB in biased forecasts case. The contour value is the difference between the
correlations of consensus errors CE and fraction of misses FOM to S the market surprise,
the y-axis is ω1 the proportion of biased forecasts, and the x-axis is rB = σB/σA the ratio
between the standard deviation of aggregated bias and the actual (shown in log-scale). The
other parameters in the model are set as rF = 1/2, rb = rB/5 and N = 20.
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Figure 12: The contour plot of Cor[Rank(CE), S] − Cor[FOM, S] as a function of the key
parameters ω1 and rB in biased forecasts case. The contour value is the difference between
the correlations of the rank score of consensus errors Rank(CE) and fraction of misses FOM
to S the market surprise, the y-axis is ω1 the proportion of biased forecasts, and the x-axis
is rB = σB/σA the ratio between the standard deviation of aggregated bias and the actual
(shown in log-scale). The other parameters in the model are set as rF = 1/2, rb = rB/5 and
N = 20.
58
0.5 1.0 2.0 5.0 10.0 20.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
rB
Co
rre
la
tio
n 
wi
th
 S
FOM
CE
CEmed
CE0.05
win
CE0.15
win
CE0.25
win
Figure 13: The comparison between the correlations of fraction of misses FOM and different
Winsorized measures CEwinλ to S the market surprise as a function of rB in biased forecasts
case, where rB = σB/σA is the ratio between the standard deviation of aggregated bias and
the actual (shown in log-scale). The other parameters in the model are set as ω1 = 0.3,
rF = 1/2, rb = rB/5 and N = 20.
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Figure 14: The comparison between the correlations of fraction of misses FOM and different
winsorized measures CEwinλ to S the market surprise as a function of ω1 in biased forecasts
case, where ω1 is the proportion of biased forecasts. The other parameters in the model are
set as rB = 10, rF = 1/2, rb = rB/5 and N = 20.
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Figure 15: The comparison between the correlations of fraction of misses FOM and different
winsorized measures CEwinλ to S the market surprise as a function of σ1/σA (shown in log-
scale) under the alternative modelling without introducing bias, where σ1 is the variance of
bad forecasts. The other parameters in the model are set as ω1 = 0.3, σ0/σA = 1/2 and
N = 20.
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Figure 16: Average CE against Rank(CE) in earnings data. Left: over the whole sample;
Right: conditional on Rank(CE) not being in the top or bottom decile.
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Figure 17: The contour plot of Cor[CE,Rank(CE)] as a function of the key parameters
θ and rB under the extended model allowing for outliers in CE. The contour value is the
correlation between consensus errors CE and its rank score Rank(CE), the x-axis is θ the
probability of tail events as defined in Section 6.2.2, and the y-axis is rB = σB/σA the ratio
between the standard deviation of aggregated bias and the actual (shown in log-scale). The
other parameters in the model are set as ω1 = 0.3, rF = 1/2, rb = rB/5 and N = 20.
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Figure 18: The contour plot of Cor[CE,FOM] as a function of the key parameters θ and rB
under the extended model allowing for outliers in CE. The contour value is the correlation
between consensus errors CE and fraction of misses FOM, the x-axis is θ the probability
of tail events as defined in Section 6.2.2, and the y-axis is rB = σB/σA the ratio between
the standard deviation of aggregated bias and the actual (shown in log-scale). The other
parameters in the model are set as ω1 = 0.3, rF = 1/2, rb = rB/5 and N = 20.
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Figure 19: The contour plot of Cor[FOM,Rank(CE)] as a function of the key parameters
θ and rB under the extended model allowing for outliers in CE. The contour value is the
correlation between fraction of misses FOM and the rank score of consensus errors Rank(CE),
the x-axis is θ the probability of tail events as defined in Section 6.2.2, and the y-axis is
rB = σB/σA the ratio between the standard deviation of aggregated bias and the actual
(shown in log-scale). The other parameters in the model are set as ω1 = 0.3, rF = 1/2,
rb = rB/5 and N = 20.
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Figure 20: The contour plot of Cor[CE, S]−Cor[FOM, S] as a function of the key parameters
θ and rB under the extended model allowing for outliers in CE. The contour value is the
difference between the correlations of consensus errors CE and fraction of misses FOM to S
the market surprise, the x-axis is θ the probability of tail events as defined in Section 6.2.2,
and the y-axis is rB = σB/σA the ratio between the standard deviation of aggregated bias
and the actual (shown in log-scale). The other parameters in the model are set as ω1 = 0.3,
rF = 1/2, rb = rB/5 and N = 20.
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Figure 21: The contour plot of Cor[Rank(CE), S] − Cor[FOM, S] as a function of the key
parameters θ and rB under the extended model allowing for outliers in CE. The contour value
is the difference between the correlations of the rank score of consensus errors Rank(CE) and
fraction of misses FOM to S the market surprise, the x-axis is θ the probability of tail events
as defined in Section 6.2.2, and the y-axis is rB = σB/σA the ratio between the standard
deviation of aggregated bias and the actual (shown in log-scale). The other parameters in
the model are set as ω1 = 0.3, rF = 1/2, rb = rB/5 and N = 20.
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